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The Use of Unethical and Unconstitutional Practices
and Policies by Prosecutors' Offices
Monroe H. Freedman*
I. INTRODUCTION

My original intention was to focus on appellate cases in which
prosecutors' offices sought to affirm convictions that involved unplanned
prosecutorial misconduct during trials. The thesis is that any trial lawyer can
go too far in the heat of a trial, but when prosecutors' offices seek to justify
unethical and unconstitutional conduct on appeal, arguing that it constitutes
acceptable trial tactics, they make the prosecutorial misconduct official policy
and encourage more of it.
As I reread cases I was familiar with, and read many more, I realized that
there are two related problems of unconstitutional and unethical conduct. One
is the adoption by a chief prosecutor of policies and/or practices for the
prosecutor's office that violate defendants' constitutional rights and
prosecutors' ethical obligations. Another problem area is the so-called
"rogue" prosecutor who purposefully adopts unethical and/or unconstitutional
tactics, like concealing exculpatory material, as defined in Brady v.
Maryland,' instead of turning it over to the defense as required by due process
and ethical rules. 2
There are two variations on the rogue prosecutor. One is the prosecutor
who has, in fact, violated office policy, but the prosecutor's office
nevertheless seeks to justify the unethical conduct on appeal, thereby making
it office policy and encouraging more misconduct like it. The other variation
is the prosecutor whose improper conduct is actually pursuant to covert office
policy. In that case, the office adopts a dual response, disavowing the
prosecutor's conduct, but, at the same time, arguing that the defendant is not
entitled to redress as the victim of the misconduct.
* Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law, Hofstra University; author, FREEDMAN &
SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (4th ed. 2010) (with Abbe Smith). Thanks to Barry Scheck for
giving me copies of documents in Texas v. Michael Morton. I am also grateful for the research help of Lisa
Spar, Assistant Director for Reference and Special Professor of Law at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law,
Hofstra University, and for comments by Barry Black, Ana Izquierdo, David Rubenstein, and Alice Woolley.
1. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2. Id. at 87; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2012). In Brady v. Maryland, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that prosecutors must disclose exculpatory material evidence to the defense upon
request. 373 U.S. at 87. Model Rule 3.8(d) is broader than the due process requirement because it does not
require that the exculpatory evidence be material. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d).
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Another related issue will be illustrated as well. One of the two greatest
scandals in lawyers' ethics is the general failure of disciplinary authorities and
courts to take appropriate remedial action against prosecutors who violate
both the constitutional rights of criminal defendants and the prosecutors' own
ethical obligations. 3 For example, a computerized review has shown that
there have been only 100 reported cases of professional discipline of federal
and state prosecutors in the previous century-an average of only one
disciplinary case per year. 4 Moreover, these cases are not limited to
violations of the rights of criminal defendants but include cases of bribery,
extortion, conversion, and embezzlement of government funds.5 As one
federal judge observed, "When faced with motions that allege governmental
misconduct, most district judges are reluctant to find that the prosecutors'
actions were flagrant, willful or in bad faith." 6 And Professor Bennett
Gershman, the leading authority on prosecutorial misconduct, has concluded
that discipline of prosecutors is "so rare as to make its use virtually a
nullity."7
Despite the reluctance of courts to find that prosecutors have acted
unethically and the failure of disciplinary authorities to sanction prosecutorial
misconduct, a difficulty in writing this Article has been selecting illustrations
from an extremely large number of cases that could have been used as
examples of unethical and unconstitutional conduct by prosecutors' offices.8
This Article, therefore, will provide illustrations of several kinds of
prosecutorial misconduct (in no particular order, and sometimes overlapping).
These case illustrations also demonstrate the general failure of courts and
3. The other major scandal is the failure to discipline criminal defense lawyers who fail to give
indigent defendants effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and competent representation
under ethical rules. Indeed, a not uncommon practice is for judges to seek out and reappoint those lawyers to
represent indigent defendants, which helps the judges to clear their calendars expeditiously. See FREEDMAN
& SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS § 4.13 (4th ed. 2010).
4. Fred C. Zacharias, The ProfessionalDiscipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REv. 721, 744-45 n.86
(2001); see also Monroe H. Freedman, The ProfessionalDiscipline of Prosecutors:A Response to Professor

Zacharias,80 HOFSTRA L. REV. 121, 124 (2001). For a review of prosecutorial misconduct in California, see
KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURCIE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
IN CALIFORNIA
1997-2009 (2010),
available at http://law.scu.edu/ncip/file/

ProsecutorialMisconductBookEntire online%20version.pdf. (updated reports for 2010 and 2011 available at
http://www.veritasinitiative.org).
5. Freedman, supra note 4, at 124.
6. United States v. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2011). The court in United States v.
Aguilar illustrated its observation by quoting from UnitedStates. v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 1080, n.2 (9th
Cir. 2008), where the conflicted district judge was quoted as saying that "the government did not act
intentionally," but saying also that the government "did not . .. act[] . . . unintentionally." Id. at 1182 n.l

(internal quotations omitted). The appellate court in Chapman found this ruling to be "somewhat confusing."
Id
7.

BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

§§

1.8(d), 13.6 (1998).

8. My intention is to focus on commonplace violations by prosecutors. I am therefore omitting two of
the most egregious cases of prosecutorial misconduct in our history. One relates to the Japanese exclusion
cases. See, e.g., PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983). The other is the litigation relating to the
imprisonment and torture of prisoners at Guantanamo and litigation relating to those people sent by the
United States to be tortured in other countries. See JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2006); CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH, EIGHT O'CLOCK FERRY ON THE WINDWARD SIDE

(2007).
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disciplinary authorities to take remedial action to punish and discourage
prosecutorial misconduct.
II. UNITED STATES V. AGUILAR

The decision in United States v. Aguila illustrates both the reluctance
of judges to find that prosecutors have deliberately acted improperly and the
failure of judges to name prosecutors even when finding that particular
prosecutors have committed serious violations of their ethical and
constitutional obligations.
After the jury found the defendants guilty of violating the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, Federal District Judge A. Howard Matz, wrote a long,
scathing opinion regarding the misconduct of a local assistant United States
attorney and two prosecutors from the main office of the Department of
Justice.10 In addition, Judge Matz candidly acknowledged his own failure to
timely recognize the prosecutors' multiple violations of their ethical and
constitutional obligations." He said, "[T]he Court denied several previous
motions to dismiss and permitted the prosecution to proceed over the heated
objections of defense counsel because it was willing to accept the prosecutors'
assurances that their conduct was inadvertent and would not be repeated. The
Court even said that it was 'not anxious to attribute a deliberate, intentional,
and devious motive' to the Government." 1 2
In characterizing the Government's conduct, Judge Matz found that "at
best . .. the Government was reckless in disregarding and failing to comply
with its duties."'13 Under the heading "MISCONDUCT FINDINGS" Judge
Matz then discussed in detail the conclusions stated below. 14
After a five-week trial and a jury verdict of guilty, however, Judge Matz
said that it was "with deep regret that this Court is compelled to find" that the
Government lawyers had
[1] allowed a key FBI agent to testify untruthfully before the grand
jury,
[2] inserted material falsehoods into affidavits submitted to
magistrate judges in support of applications for search warrants and
seizure warrants,
[3] improperly reviewed e-mail communications between one
Defendant and her lawyer,
[4] recklessly failed to comply with its discovery obligations,

9. 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
10. See Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180. In addition to three experienced prosecutors, the government's
trial team included some paralegals and a large number of FBI agents. Id at 1184.
11. Seeid.ati182.
12. Id
13. Id. at 1209.
14. Id. at 1187-1200.
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[5] posed questions to certain witnesses in violation of the Court's
rulings,
[6] engaged in questionable behavior during closing argument, and
[7] even made misrepresentations to the Court.15
With regard to the Government's failure to produce discovery materials,
Judge Matz said, "the Court ordered that all the transcripts of [grand jury
testimony] be produced to the Defendants in their entirety ....
Opening
statements began on April 5, 2011. The transcripts were produced, finally, on
April 15, 2011, more than ten days after the openings. Or so the Court and
Defendants believed, based on the Government's representations. Not so, as
it turned out."l 6
On April 7, 2011, two days after the opening statements, the prosecution
assured the court that it had conducted a "top-to-bottom review of discovery"
and that it had not only met its "obligation but exceed[ed] it." 17 In fact,
critical grand jury testimony, which would have been extremely useful to the
defense in its opening statement and closing argument to the jury, was not
produced until seven weeks after the jury's verdict.18
Judge Matz added, "The belated and incomplete disclosure of
the .. . grand jury testimony was prejudicial for an entirely different
reason ... it prevented the ... Defendants from presenting important
evidence of potential grand jury bias to the Court that might have warranted
dismissal even before trial began, thereby sparing Defendants the costs,
travail and attendant burdens of a more than five week ordeal." 1 9 The judge
further explained, "The financial costs of the investigation and trial were
immense, but the emotional drubbing these individuals absorbed undoubtedly
was even worse." 20
Accordingly, Judge Matz dismissed the indictment with prejudice, "not
only as a deterrent but to release [the defendant] from further anguish and
uncertainty." 2 1 He added that, in view of the prosecutors' "many wrongful
acts," they should not be permitted to retry the defendants, and he expressed
the hope that "this ruling will have a valuable prophylactic effect." 22
Despite his desire to achieve a "deterrent" to prosecutorial abuse and his
hope that his ruling would have a "valuable prophylactic effect," Judge Matz
did not name the prosecutors who had disregarded the court's orders, acted
15. Id. at 1182.
16. Id. at 1192.
17. Id. at 1193 (internal quotations omitted).
18. See id.at 1192.
19. Id. at 1205.
20. Id. at 1209. "Expressing the idea that the government seeks justice... it is said that the
government wins its point even when a not-guilty verdict is returned. That is also true in a less idealistic,
more cynical, sense: the prosecution wins even when the defendant is found innocent because, typically, the
defendant will carry for life the severe wounds of his encounter with justice." FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra
note 3, § 10.04.
21. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 1210 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
22. Id.
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unethically, and violated the defendants's constitutional rights.23 Instead, he
referred throughout his opinion to "the Government" or "a prosecutor." 24 In
addition, Judge Matz did not hold the prosecutors in contempt for repeatedly
violating his orders nor refer their conduct to an appropriate disciplinary
authority. 25
Judge Matz's hopes of a deterrent and prophylactic effect were promptly
dashed by Charles Duross, the chief prosecutor of Foreign Corrupt Practices
in the U.S. Department of Justice. Duross assured the public that the integrity
of the prosecutors in the Aguilar case was "above reproach." 2 6
In defending the unethical conduct of members of his office, Duross has
not only encouraged future ethical violations, but has violated his own ethical
obligations.
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1(a) requires a
supervisory lawyer to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the
office conform to their ethical obligations. 2 7 Furthermore, Model Rule
5.1(c)(1) makes a lawyer responsible for another's ethical violations if the
lawyer ratifies the other's ethical misconduct. 28
III. UNITED STATES V. LOPEz-AVILA

The decision in United States v. Lopez-Avila 29 illustrates deliberate
unethical conduct by a prosecutor and the extremely unusual action of a court
to identify the prosecutor by name. In addition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit took steps to refer the matter to the appropriate authorities
for professional discipline. However, the prosecutor's office made its own
efforts to protect its prosecutor from embarrassment for his unethical conduct
and his violation of a defendant's right to due process.
Defendant Lopez-Avila originally pleaded guilty to smuggling drugs. 30
In entering a guilty plea, a defendant is typically required to state on the
record (1) that she is pleading guilty because she is guilty and (2) that she has
not been coerced or threatened by the prosecution to enter the plea.31

23. Id
24. Id. at 1208.
25. See Aguilar,831 F. Supp. 2d 1180.
26. Jon Pacenti, Federal Prosecutors Not Backing Off on Policing Foreign Bribes, DAILY BUSINESS
REVIEW.COM (March 5,2010), www.dailybusinessreview.com.
27.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2012).

28. Id. R. 5.1(c)(1).
29. 678 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012).
30. Id. at 958.
31. Everyone in the courtroom, including the judge, knows that these responses are perjury. See
generally Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manfestofor Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 911 (2005).
A guilty plea is coerced by a threat of an extremely long sentence if the defendant goes to trial and is
convicted, and it is also induced by the prosecutor's promise to recommend a shorter sentence in return for
the guilty plea and by the understanding that the judge will accede to the prosecutor's sentencing
recommendation. The colloquy between the judge and the defendant, in which the defendant states that she
has not been induced to plead by any threats or promises, is designed to prevent the defendant from later
trying to maintain that the plea was not voluntary.
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However, Lopez-Avila was later allowed to withdraw her guilty plea and
go to trial on the drug-smuggling charge. 32 The reason for allowing her to
withdraw the plea was that Lopez-Avila had pleaded guilty without having
been aware that she had a defense of duress to the charge because she had
been threatened with serious harm if she did not smuggle the drugs,
something her lawyer learned after the plea agreement. 33
In cross-examining Defendant Lopez-Avila at the trial, AUSA Jerry R.
Albert, of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Arizona, sought to
show that Lopez-Avila had admitted to a federal magistrate at an earlier
hearing that she had not been coerced to smuggle the drugs.3 4 But what
AUSA Albert represented as being the colloquy between the magistrate judge
and Lopez-Avila was actually a half-truth that confused the defendant and
misled the court and defense counsel.
AUSA Albert gave the court and defense counsel an altered copy of the
question and answer at the hearing before the magistrate judge, and then,
based on that altered version, AUSA Albert conducted the cross-examination
of Lopez-Avila as follows:
"Q: Do you recall testifying under oath on February 24th, 2010, and
being asked this question by the . .. Magistrate Judge:

Ms. Lopez, has anyone threatened you?
And ... did you give the following answer: No.
Did you tell that under oath to Magistrate Judge Guerin?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
Q: Was that a lie?
DEFENDANT: How is that? I don't understand.
Q: Well ... you've now admitted that you in fact told the
[magistrate] judge that you were not threatened in this case. And
I'm asking you was your testimony on February 24th, 2010, while
you were under oath, was that a lie? Did you lie to the judge about
not being threatened?
DEFENDANT: Yes."35
However, the colloquy between Lopez-Avila and the magistrate had in
fact taken place during Lopez-Avila's submission of her guilty plea, and the
full question by the magistrate was, "Ms. Lopez, has anyone threatened you
or forced you to plead guilty?"36 AUSA Albert omitted the italicized
clause.37 The effect was to conceal the fact that Lopez-Avila was saying that
she had not been coerced to submit the guilty plea and to make it appear that
she was saying that she had not been forced to smuggle the drugs.
32. Lopez-Avila, 678 F.3d at 959.

33. Id
34. Id at 959-60.
35. Id. at 960.
36. Id.

37. Id

UnethicalProsecutorPracticesand Policies
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When the trial judge realized what the prosecution had done, he declared
a mistrial but declined to do so with prejudice. 38 The defense then appealed
to the Ninth Circuit claiming double jeopardy, but the appeal was denied.3 9
In its opinion, however, the Ninth Circuit took the unusual step of referring to
the prosecutor by name and suggesting that, on remand, the district court
might want to discipline Albert directly. 40
The action by the Ninth Circuit in naming the unethical prosecutor in its
opinion was so unusual that the U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona filed
a motion requesting the that the court delete Albert's name from its final
published opinion. 4 1 The court rejected the U.S. Attorney's argument that
naming Albert would be inappropriate because no disciplinary proceedings
had been concluded on the matter of Albert's alleged misconduct. 4 2
The Ninth Circuit responded that it did "not need a record greater or
different than [it had in the trial transcript] to determine that Albert should not
have misrepresented the transcript's question." 43 The court further observed,
"The mistake in judgment does not lie with [AUSA] Albert alone. We are
also troubled by the government's continuing failure to acknowledge and take
responsibility for Albert's error. The Department of Justice has an obligation
to its lawyers and to the public to prevent prosecutorial misconduct.
Prosecutors, as servants of the law, are subject to constraints and
responsibilities that do not apply to other lawyers; they must serve truth and
justice first.. . . That did not happen here . .. . When a prosecutor steps over
the boundaries of proper conduct and into unethical territory, the government
has a duty to own up to it and to give assurances that it will not happen again.
Yet, we cannot find a single hint of appreciation of the seriousness of the
misconduct within the pages of the government's brief on appeal."4
The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the U.S. Attorney's Office in Arizona
regularly makes public the names of prosecutors who do good work and win
important victories . . .. If federal prosecutors receive public credit for their

good works-as they should-they should not be able to hide behind the
shield of anonymity when they make serious mistakes."'45

38. Id. at 960-61.
39. Id. at 958.
40. Id. at 965-66.
41.

Id. at 965.

42. Id
43. Id.
44. Id. at 964-65 (citation omitted).
45. Id. at 965 (citing e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Arizona, Northern
Arizona Man Sentenced to Federal Prison for Arson, (January 31, 2012) (The prosecution was handled by
Christina J. Reid-Moore, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix)) (internal quotations
omitted).
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IV. UNITED STATES V. WALLACH

United States v. Wallach46 further illustrates the Government's efforts to
justify a failure to take appropriate action on Brady material even when, as the
Second Circuit found, it either knew or should have known of its existence. 4 7
The opinion in Wallach focused on a government witness, Anthony Guariglia,
whose testimony was "the centerpiece of the government's case" and essential
to the case against the defendant. 48
Guariglia testified that, during a crucial period, he had not been
gambling. 49 The Government had information, however, that during the
relevant time, Guariglia-who had a history of compulsive gambling-had
bought $65,000 worth of chips in an Atlantic City gambling parlor.5 o Without
conducting an adequate investigation, the Government accepted Guariglia's
explanation that he had cashed $15,000 of the chips and that he had bought
the remainder for a friend, but that he had not gambled himself.5 1 Not
surprisingly, a later investigation by the defense produced ample evidence that
the witness had in fact gambled with the chips. 52
In addition, the defense proffered testimony and casino records at the
trial to establish that Guariglia had placed bets during the relevant period.53
The Government objected that the proffer was extrinsic evidence that was
being offered only to impeach Guariglia's credibility and that it was therefore
subject to exclusion; the trial court sustained the objection. 54 The prosecution
nevertheless sought to rehabilitate Guariglia on redirect, permitting him to
testify that he had bought the chips but had not gambled with them. 55
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Government urged the court to
uphold the conviction, in part on the ground that Guariglia's perjury was
merely cumulative impeaching material.56 Rejecting this argument and
ordering a new trial, the Second Circuit held. that "[t]he taint of [the] false
testimony is not erased because his untruthfulness affects only his credibility
as a witness. The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence." 57
46. 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991).
47. Id. at 457. The lawyers supporting Wallach in his appeal were unusual colleagues. They included
Robert Bork (retained) and Michael Tigar and Ellen Yaroshefsky (amici). Id at 449.
48. Id at 457-58. The court explained that Guariglia and one other witness "offered the only
testimony that directly linked the defendants with the admittedly illegal conduct of Wedtech. Indeed, their
testimony was, to say the least, critical to the government." Id. at 455. The court also explained that the
other witness was an admitted perjurer and the jury was warned of this, which necessarily placed greater
importance on Guariglia's testimony. Id at 455, 457.
49. Id. at 455-56.
50. Id
51. Id at 456.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 457.
56. Id. at 458.
57. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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Also, with regard to the Government's contention that it had not known
that the witness's testimony was false, the Second Circuit said that it was
"convinced that the government should have known that Guariglia was
committing perjury." 5 8

The court feared that "given the importance of

Guariglia's testimony to the case, the prosecutors may have consciously
avoided recognizing the obvious-that is, that Guariglia was not telling the
truth."S9
Moreover, the Government acknowledged that it had received additional
information concerning the falsity of the Guariglia's testimony. 60 However,
the Government pointed out that this information had come to it months after
the conclusion of the trial and contended that it was therefore too late to order
a new trial.61 The court also rejected this argument, holding that "[t]his
additional information in itself provides a sufficient basis for granting the
defendant[] a new trial." 62
In effect, the Second Circuit recognized that the prosecutors had failed to
act in accord with their ethical obligations under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which state that "[a prosecutor] has the responsibility
of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate." 6 3 Moreover, the
official comment to Model Rule 3.8 continues by insisting that a prosecutor's
duty, far from attempting to preserve a miscarriage of justice, is "to rectify the
conviction of innocent persons." 64 Nor is it enough that the prosecutor insists
that he or she is satisfied that the defendant is not factually innocent, because
a prosecutor's responsibility also carries with it the obligation to see that "the
defendant is accorded procedural justice."65 This was not the case in
Wallach.

Despite its strong criticism of the prosecutors in its Wallach opinion, the
court took pains not to name any particular prosecutor. Instead, the court
referred throughout its opinion to "the government" and, in a particular
instance, to "[o]ne of the prosecutors." 66 Nor did the court refer the trial
prosecutors to a disciplinary committee for possible sanctions. 67

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 457.
Id.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 456.
Id at 458.

63. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2012); accord id. R. 3.3 (using false testimony
before a tribunal); id. R. 3.4 (using and preserving false evidence); and id. R. 8.4 (conduct involving
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
64. Id. 3.8 cmt. 1.
65. Id.
66. Wallach, 935 F.2d at 459.
67. Because it had been implicated in Guariglia's perjury, the government sought to distance itself
from Guariglia by taking the unusual step of prosecuting him for perjury. See id. at 455 n.2. The fact that
prosecution of a government witness for perjury is rare is explained in Monroe H. Freedman, The
Cooperating Witness Who Lies-A Challenge to Defense Lawyers, Prosecutors, and Judges, 7 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 739, 745 (2010).
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V. TEXAS V. MORTON

Texas v. Morton68 involved a defendant who spent twenty-five years in
prison for a murder he did not commit.69 The prosecution alleged that
Michael Morton had bludgeoned his wife Christine to death in their bed and
then went to work at 5:30 a.m., leaving their three-and-half year-old son in the
house alone with the body. 70 Morton argued-truthfully as it turned outthat, after he had left, an intruder must have entered the house and killed
Christine. 7 1
A new district attorney, John Bradley, successfully fought Morton's
access to DNA evidence for five years.72 When Morton finally obtained the
DNA, it proved that Morton was innocent and implicated another man, a felon
with a long criminal record who lived twelve miles from the Mortons'
house. 73 The prosecutors had strong evidence against that man at the time of
Morton's trial, but it was not revealed to Morton's defense lawyers. 74
Upon his release from prison, Morton pressed for an investigation of the
prosecutors responsible for his false conviction. 75 His persistent efforts
resulted in an unprecedented judicial inquiry into whether the prosecutors
suppressed evidence of Morton's innocence. In addition, the state bar has
taken the unusual step of opening an investigation into the prosecutors'
conduct. 76
Discussing Morton's case, the Wall Street Journal reported,
"exonerations have rarely led to scrutiny of prosecutors, who enjoy broad
immunity from civil suits and a measure of professional courtesy that
discourages defense lawyers and judges from filing complaints that could lead
to state bar investigations." 77 One reason defense lawyers are reluctant to file
charges against prosecutors is the concern that the prosecutors' offices will
retaliate against the lawyers' clients in future cases. 78 And judges,

68. Plea to Jurisdiction, Motion to Quash and for Protective Order, No. 86-452-K26 (26th Jud. Dist.
Williamson Cnty., Tex. (2011)) [hereinafter Plea to Jurisdiction].
69. Id. at 1. The facts recited below are from a 143-page Report to Court, prepared by Morton's
lawyers and based upon depositions, statements, and other materials that were developed as a result of an
investigation authorized by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 12.
72. Id. at 13.
73. Id
74. Id. at 2.
75. Id. at 135-36.
76. Nathan Koppel, Freed Convict Pushes Rare Probe of Prosecutors, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2011, at

A2.
77. Id. (relying upon interviews with lawyers, the Executive Director of the National District Attorneys
Association, and a specialist on lawyers' ethics).
78. Also, judges say that they assume that disciplinary offices will take appropriate action, and
disciplinary authorities say that they rely on the prosecutors' offices to impose sanctions for prosecutorial
misconduct, which rarely, if ever, happens.
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particularly those who are subject to re-election, do not want to appear to be
anti-prosecutor. 79
At the time of Morton's trial in 1987, DNA testing was not available to
either party.8 0 In 2005, Morton filed a motion to test a bandana that
Christine's brother had found the day after the murder at a construction site
next to a wooded area directly behind the Mortons' home.8 1 The DNA
proved that some of the blood on the bandana was Christine's and that the rest
belonged to Mark Alan Norwood. 82 Norwood had previously been charged
with burglary and assault with intent to murder. 8 3 Norwood has since been
charged with the murder of Christine Morton. 84 In addition, Norwood has
been charged with the murder of another woman, a wife and mother in her
early thirties, who was bludgeoned to death in her bed in the same
neighborhood a year after Christine's death.
The chief prosecutor in Morton's case was Ken Anderson, who is now a
Texas state court judge sitting on criminal trials. Anderson argued to the jury
that Morton had murdered his wife in a rage after she declined to have sexual
intercourse with him.86 Anderson did not provide the following documents to
Morton's trial counsel as required by due process of law and by Anderson's
ethical obligations:
(1) The transcript of a taped interview by Anderson's chief
investigator in which Christine's mother said that the Morton's little
boy, Eric, said that he had seen a man ("the monster") who had "a
big mustache," and who was not his "Daddy," beat his mother to
death at a time when his "Daddy" was not there.87 Eric's description
of the intruder is consistent with Norwood's appearance then and
now, and Eric's account included a number of details that are
consistent with the crime, the crime scene, and the murder weapon.88
(2) A memo by the chief investigator to Anderson summarizing the
interview with Christine's mother.8 9
(3) A telephone message to the chief investigator two days after the
murder from the police in San Antonio.90 The message said that
Christine's missing credit card had been recovered at a jewelry store
in San Antonio and that a police officer in that city would be able to

79. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 8.10.
80. Plea to Jurisdiction, supra note 68, at 12.
81. Id
82. Id. at 13.
83. Id. at 14.
84. Brandi Grissom & John Schwartz, Exoneratedof Murder, Texan Seeks Inquiry on Prosecutor,TEX.
TRIB., Dec. 19, 2011, http://www.texastribune.org/2011/12/19/exonerated-murder-morton-seeks-prosecutorinquiry/.
85. Brandi Grissom, Mark Norwood Indicted in SecondAustin Murder, TEX. TRIB., Nov. 9, 2012, http:/
/www.texastribune.org/2012/1 1/09/mark-norwood-faces-grand-jury-second-austin-murder/.
86. Plea to Jurisdiction, supra note 68, at 12.
87. Id at 17, 58 (internal quotations omitted).
88. Id. at 83.
89. Id at 17.
90. Id
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identify the woman who had attempted to use the card." The
identified woman was a prior offender with "$1000 in fraud on
her."9 2 There is no indication that the prosecution followed up on
this message.
(4) A police report that a neighbor of the Mortons had on several
occasions observed a man park a green van on the street behind the
Mortons' home and walk into the wooded area. 94 The report also
said that another neighbor might know where the man lives.
In addition, a former Assistant District Attorney, now in private practice,
has given Morton's lawyers an affidavit saying that she was present when
Anderson and another prosecutor discussed how they could neutralize Eric's
testimony if the defense should learn what Eric had said and use him as a
witness. The defense lawyers did not offer Eric as a witness because the
prosecution successfully concealed the interview with Christine's mother. 96
Nevertheless, Anderson repeatedly and emphatically assured the trial
judge in prosecuting Morton that he was well aware of his Brady obligations
and that he had complied with them fully. 97 John Bradley, the District
Attorney who succeeded Anderson, has since said that he opposed Morton's
access to the DNA material for so long and so strenuously because Anderson,
a friend of his, had urged him to do so. 98 Bradley now regrets having delayed
Morton's access to the DNA, which resulted in keeping Morton in prison for
five additional years. 99 At the time of this writing, there has not been a
decision regarding Anderson's culpability. 00
VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S FAILURE REGARDING PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT

A. Connick v. Thompson
In Connick v. Thompson,' 0 the U.S. Supreme Court considered the case
of John Thompson, who, having been convicted of murder, spent eighteen
years in prison, fourteen of them isolated on death row.102 In his trial for
91. Id
92. Id (internal quotations omitted).
93. Id
94. Id. at 17-18.
95. Id. at 18.
96. See id. at 38.
97. Id at 34.
98. See id. at 7.
99. See id. at 4.
100. See Brandi Grissom, Ken Anderson Responds to State Bar's Ethics Filing, TEx. TRIB., Nov. 5,
2012, http://www.texastribune.org/2012/1 1/05/ken-anderson-responds-ethics-lawsuit/ (Disciplinary charges
filed against Anderson by State Bar of Texas remain unresolved.); Brandi Grissom, Norwood Trial in Morton
Murder Set for March, TEx. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2012, http://www.texastribune.org/2012/12/12/court-inquirymichael-morton-case-delayed/ (delaying court of inquiry, which will determine whether Ken Anderson faces
criminal charges, until Feb. 4, 2013).
101. 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
102. Id. at 1355.

2012]

UnethicalProsecutorPracticesand Policies

13

murder, Thompson did not testify because he had previously been convicted
of an unrelated crime, attempted armed robbery.10 3 If a defendant testifies in
his defense, the prosecution can introduce evidence of prior convictions,
which would otherwise be inadmissible. As commonly happens, Thompson
gave up his constitutional right to testify in order to avoid prejudicing the jury
in the murder case with the knowledge of his armed robbery conviction. 104
However, when a defendant does not take the stand, his chances of being
convicted increase substantially. 0 5
Both the armed robbery trial and the murder trial were prosecuted by
Assistant District Attorney James Williams of the Orleans Parish District
Attorney's Office. 106 He was assisted by three other prosecutors in both
cases, including Eric Dubelier, the third-in-command of the office.10 7 The
head of the office was District Attorney Harry Connick.os
One month before Thompson's scheduled execution, his investigator
discovered Brady material from his armed robbery trial that showed
Thompson's innocence-evidence that the prosecutors withheld from the
defense. 109 As a result, both of Thompson's convictions were vacated; the
murder conviction was vacated on the ground that he had been deprived of the
constitutional right to testify in his own defense because of his wrongful
conviction in the armed robbery case.110
The District Attorney's office then retried Thompson on the murder
charge."' This time, Thompson had the benefit of compelling exculpatory
material that had not been revealed to his lawyers in the first murder trial.1 12
After deliberating only thirty-five minutes, the jury found him not guilty.113
Thompson subsequently sued the District Attorney's office on the
ground that the conduct by its members of withholding Brady evidence had
violated his constitutional rights by causing him to be wrongfully convicted,
imprisoned for eighteen years, and nearly executed.1 14 Specifically, he
alleged that the violation was caused by Connick's failure to train prosecutors

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Edward Bennett Williams, The Trial ofa Criminal Case, 29 N.Y. ST. B. BULL. 36, 42 (1957)
("The fact ... is that a defendant who does not take the stand does not in reality enjoy any longer the
presumption of innocence."); see also, Mitchell J. Frank & Dawn Broschard, The Silent Criminal Defendant
and the Presumption of rsnocence: In the Hands ofReal Jurors, Is Either of Them Safe?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK

L. REv. 237, 261-68 (2006) (finding that jurors in Florida held the defendant's choice not to testify against
him).
106. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356, 1372 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1372 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
108. See id.
109. Id at 1355 (majority opinion).
110. Id. at 1355-57.
111. Id. at 1357.
112. Id. at 1376 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
113. Id

114. Id at 1357 (majority opinion).
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in his office regarding their constitutional obligations." 5 The jury found the
office liable on this ground and awarded Thompson $14 million dollars in
damages.116
The jury's award was ultimately appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
with Justice Clarence Thomas writing the opinion for a majority of five
justices reversing the jury's award.1 17 Justice Thomas asserted that the Brady
violation in Thompson's case was a single incident and did not represent a
pattern or policy. 118
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the dissent on behalf of herself and
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.'l 9 The evidence showed, she wrote,
that "[w]hat happened here ... was no momentary oversight, no single
incident of a lone officer's misconduct[,]" but that Brady violations were
"pervasive in Orleans Parish."' 20
In their testimony, Connick and other prosecutors in the office revealed
their misunderstanding of Brady obligations. As Connick explained, he had
"stopped reading law books ... and looking at opinions when he was first
elected District Attorney" thirty years earlier. 12 1 He also admitted that he had
himself withheld a crime lab report in violation of Brady and had been
indicted by the U.S. Attorney for having done so. 12 2 In addition, Connick
admitted that he had terminated a grand jury investigation of prosecutorial
misconduct because it would "make his job more difficult."l 23
Ginsburg's assessment of Connick's policy, based on the record in the
case, has since been confirmed by former members of his office, who have
said that the office under Connick maintained a "win-at-all-cost approach and
a restrictive attitude towards its obligations to hand [over] evidence." 1 24 In an
affidavit in another Brady-related wrongful conviction case, a former
prosecutor in Connick's office said, "[t]he policy was '[w]hen in doubt, don't
give it up.' "125

115. Id. at 1376 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
116. Id at 1357 (majority opinion).
117. Id at 1355.
118. Id at 1361-62.
119. Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
120. Id
121. Id at 1380.
122. Id at 1378.
123. Id at 1375.
124. Campbell Robertson & Adam Liptak, Louisiana Prosecutors' Methods Raise Scrutiny Again, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2011, at Al9.
125. Id In another case, in 2009, after the defendant had been convicted and sentenced to death, it was
revealed that the prosecutors had not turned over a videotaped interview with a key witness in which she had
contradicted her trial testimony in several significant respects, nor had they revealed the nature of a deal with
a jailhouse informer who testified for the prosecution. Id. Prosecutors' questionable use of jailhouse
informers, or snitches, is discussed infra Part VII.A.
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B. Smith v. Cain
Imposing sanctions, including civil liability, against prosecutors who
engage in misconduct, does "make [the prosecutor's] job more difficult[,]"
but condoning that misconduct encourages more of it.126 This has been
shown dramatically in Smith v. Cain,127 a case that came out of the same New
Orleans parish as Connick v. Thompson.

Juan Smith was convicted of participating in a mass murder when a
group of men burst into a house in search of drugs and killed five people. 128
His conviction was based solely on the eyewitness testimony of a survivor,
Larry Boatner. Boatner told the jury that "he had [n]o doubt that Smith was
the gunman." 29 That unequivocal testimony was contradicted, however, by
files from the police investigation of the case. 130 The lead investigator's
"notes from the night of the murder state that Boatner 'could not . .. supply a
description of the perpetrators other [than] they were black males.' "131 Also,
Boatner told the investigator five days later that he "could not ID anyone
because [he] couldn't see faces and would not know them if [he] saw
them."1 32 The prosecutors unlawfully and unethically withheld these files
from the defense, but they were discovered and used in Smith's habeas corpus
attack on his conviction.
The brief for the District Attorney's Office did not dispute that Boatner's
statements had been withheld from the defense.133 Nevertheless, the
prosecution justified its misconduct on appeal by contending that the failure to
turn over the exculpatory material had been harmless because the jury would
have ignored it. 134
In oral argument of the case before the U.S. Supreme Court, even
members of the Connick v. Thompson majority were incredulous. Chief
Justice Roberts said that any defense lawyer would want to have an
eyewitness's statement that said "I couldn't identify them."135 And Justice
Scalia said, "Of course it should have been turned over."l 36
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the Court vacating Smith's
conviction; only Justice Thomas dissented. However, Roberts's opinion
indicated that the Court has not learned that it has been encouraging
prosecutors to violate Brady and then justify the violations as harmless error.
In its opinion, the Court emphasized that Boatner's testimony was material
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1375.
132 S. Ct. 627 (2012).
Id. at 629.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 629-30.
Id at 629.

132. Id at 629-30 (internal quotations omitted).
133. Robertson & Liptak, supra note 124.
134. Id.
135. Adam Liptak, Justices Rebuke a New Orleans Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, at A18.
136. Id
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because it was the principal evidence against Smith and observed that
"evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the State's other
evidence is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict." 37 This
means, of course, that the Court is still willing to allow prosecutors to get
away with serious Brady violations by arguing that the violation is not
material.
A final irony in Smith v. Cain is that the lead prosecutor in the case,
Roger W. Jordan, Jr., had previously been found guilty of Brady violations.1 38
Accordingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court suspended him from practicing
law for three months. 139 Then, noting that it had never disciplined a
prosecutor for violating a Brady obligation, the court suspended Jordan's
three-month suspension. 14 0
VII. SOME CATEGORIES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

A. Prosecutors' Use of "Cooperating Witnesses" or Snitches
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, many cooperating
witnesses are "outright conscienceless sociopaths" who will do anything to
benefit themselves, including "lying, committing perjury, manufacturing
evidence, soliciting others to corroborate their lies with more lies, and double
crossing anyone with whom they come into contact." 1 4 1 One career
informant explained his "code": "I don't set up people I know. I only set up
nobodies." 42 Nevertheless, prosecutors commonly encourage and use
cooperating witnesses and, not surprisingly, this practice has resulted in a
significant number of wrongful convictions. 143
Another, Leslie White, admitted that, in more than a dozen cases in
which he had been imprisoned for crimes, including robbery and kidnaping,
he had earned his release by falsely testifying that someone else had
confessed a crime to him. 144 "Every time I come in here," White boasted, "I
inform and get back out." 1 45 Yet, prosecutors repeatedly used him as a
witness, and the California Attorney General's Office refused to re-open the

137.
138.
139.
140.

Cain, 132 S. Ct. at 630 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13, & n.21 (1976)).
Robertson & Liptak, supra note 124.
Id.
Id.

141. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 1013 (quoting STEPHEN S. TROTT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, 117-18 (1988)). The author was Stephen S. Trott, then an

Associate Attorney General, now a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Id.
142. Ted Conover, A Snitch's Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/
01/magazine/alex-white-professional-snitch.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0(internal quotations omitted).
143. See Informants, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/SnitchesInformants.php (last visited Dec. 30, 2012) (reporting that such testimony was a key factor in more than
fifteen percent of wrongful convictions uncovered by DNA evidence).
144. A Snitch's Story in L.A: An Informer Blows the Whistle on Himself TIME, Dec. 12, 1988, at 32.
145. Id.
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cases in which White had testified. 14 6 Furthermore, the Los Angeles County
District Attorney's Office rejected their own prosecutors' recommendations
that it establish a central record index of jail-house informants. 147
Two reasons for the decision not to keep a central record index of jailhouse informants were revealed in a memo marked "Confidential" from a
chief deputy to the Director of Bureau, Branch and Area Operations. 148 The
first reason is that a central record would help defense lawyers attack the
credibility of repeat snitches, like Leslie White. 149 The second is that such a
record could lead to charges that the Sheriffs Department "intentionally put
jailhouse informants in jail cells with defendants from whom law enforcement
could use a confession"-a practice that the U.S. Supreme Court has held to
be a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when an accused has a
lawyer.1 50
B. The Prosecution'sCondonation ofPerjuryfor the Prosecution
"The dirty little secret in this country, and it's not such a secret, is that 5if
you perjure yourself for the prosecution, no one's going to prosecute you."' '
However, if the cooperating witness turns on the prosecution by recanting the
incriminating testimony, a perjury prosecution of the cooperating witness
follows. 152
An example of a prosecution witness who committed perjury for the
prosecution with impunity is Mario Montuoro, who was a repeat cooperating
witness for the DOJ.15 3 His criminal record included four arrests, one of them
for possession of heroin and one for possession of a gun.154
On one occasion Montuoro told the Federal Organized Crime Strike
Force in Brooklyn that Ronald Schiavone and Raymond Donovan, officers of
Schiavone Construction Company, were guilty of making an illegal cash
payment to a union official. 155 Montuoro testified before a federal grand jury

146. See Ted Rohrlich, Informant Told Tester of Lying Back in 1987, L.A. TIMES (DEC. 2, 1988),
available athttp://articles.latimes.com/1988-12-02/local/me- l 15_ljailhouse-informant.
147. Martin Berg, D.A. Memo Airs PrivateSuspicions ofSnitch Misuse, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 17, 1989, at
1.
148. Id
149. Id
150. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964).
151. Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1999, at 66, 77 (quoting Walter F.
Rowe, professor of forensic science at George Washington University).
152. Examples of cases in which a cooperating witness was prosecuted for multiple counts of peijury
after turning on the prosecution by recanting include Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 103-04 (1978) and
United States v. Tibbs, 600 F.2d 19, 20-21 (6th Cir. 1979).
153. In re Application for Appointment of Indep. Counsel, 596 F. Supp. 1465, 1466 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
154. Id.
155. Id. Schiavone and Donovan were prominent citizens. Donovan was Secretary of Labor in
President Reagan's Cabinet from 1981-1985. Schiavone held two degrees from Dartmouth College and was
a member of the Dartmouth Board of Overseers and an officer of national and state professional
organizations.
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that the payment had been made during a luncheon at Prudenti's Restaurant in
May or June of 1977.156

The grand jury declined to indict Schiavone and Donovan and,
thereafter, a federal court appointed Leon Silverman, a prominent lawyer, to
be Special Prosecutor to investigate Montuoro's testimony about the luncheon
at Prudenti's. 157 With the help of three Assistant Special Prosecutors and the
FBI,158 the Special Prosecutor conducted an exhaustive investigation and
concluded that "no credible evidence exist[ed] that a luncheon as alleged by
Montuoro ever occurred." 1 59
Perjury, of course, was one of the several serious federal crimes that
Montuoro had committed as a cooperating witness.160 Nevertheless, the DOJ
refused requests by Schiavone that Montuoro be prosecuted.161
C. Turning on the Victim to Maintaina Conviction

Some prosecutors like to claim that they have a duty to victims of crimes
to prosecute zealously.162 But they are not above trashing the victim if it
serves to support a bad conviction. For example, in Illinois v. Juan Rivera, 163
the defendant was convicted in part on snitch testimony and in part on a
coerced confession. The victim was Holly Staker, an eleven-year-old girl
who was raped and brutally murdered.164 When DNA showed that the sperm
in Holly's vagina was not Rivera's, the prosecutor made the absurd and
repulsive argument that the child had been "sexually active" and, therefore,
the fact that the sperm was not Rivera's did not exculpate him. 165
Similarly, in a case in Nassau County, New York, when DNA showed
that the sperm in a sixteen-year-old victim was not that of the man convicted
of the crime, the prosecution argued that it "must have come from a
156. Id.
157. Id
158. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, No. 81-2, Sept. Term 1981,
Report of the Special Prosecutor, vol. 1,p. 3 (June 25, 1982).
159. In re Application for Appointment ofIndep. Counsel, 596 F. Supp. at 1466. Among other serious

discrepancies in his story, Montuoro said that Schiavone was walking normally at the time of the luncheon.
In fact, during the time in question, Schiavone was on crutches and wearing a cast up to his thigh because of
a skiing accident.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Erica Goode, When DNA Evidence Suggests "Innocent,' Some Prosecutors Cling to

"Maybe," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.con2011/l1/16/us/dna-evidence-of-innocencerejected-by-some-prosecutors.html?pagewanted=all.
163. 777 N.E.2d 360 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
164. Id. at 360. Rivera was exonerated but was retried in 2009. Andrew Martin, Court Reverses
Conviction of Man Jailed for 19 Years in Rape and Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.

10, 2011, http://

www.nytimes.com/2011/12/1 1/us/illinois-court-reverses-conviction-of-man-jailed-in-rape-murder.html
[hereinafter Martin, Court Reverses]. He was finally freed in 2012, after nineteen years in prison. Mitch
Dudek, After 19 Years in Prisonfor Girl's Murder, Juan Rivera Goes Free, CHICAGO SuN-TIMES, Jan. 6,

2012,
http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/985 1013-418/man-jailed-I 9-years-in- 11-year-olds-stabbingdeath-to-go-free.html.
165. Andrew Martin, The Prosecution's Case Against DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2011, http://

www.nytimes.com/2011/l l/27/magazine/dna-evidence-lake-county.html?pagewanted=all.
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consensual lover, even though [the girl's] mother and best friend insisted that
she was a virgin."l66 The unnamed lover theory has been used by prosecutors
so often that defense lawyers have a name for it. Varying the term unindicted
co-conspirator, defense lawyers refer to it as the "unindicted coejaculator."1 67
D. PrejudicialPretrialPublicity by Prosecutors

The First Amendment right to freedom of speech is never more
important to an individual than when he or she is the accused in a criminal
prosecution. 168 In contrast to the defense lawyer, the prosecutor is not the
spokesperson for a private citizen. Rather, the prosecutor acts under color of
law as an agent of the Government. In that official capacity, the prosecutor is
privileged to publish to the world-including the defendant's family, friends,
neighbors, and business associates-the most heinous and defamatory charges
in an indictment.
Despite this devastating impact on the reputation of the accused, it is
essential that indictments are open to public scrutiny; secret indictments are
familiar weapons of tyrannous governments. In addition, in a particular case,
a prosecutor may find a compelling law enforcement purpose justifying a
public announcement, such as to notify the public that the accused is at large
and dangerous. Also, the prosecutor should be permitted to respond publicly
if the defense accuses the prosecutor of unlawful or unethical conduct in the
case.
Beyond those limited situations, however, there is no legitimate reason
for a prosecutor, as an agent of the government, to engage in pretrial
publicity, including press conferences and leaks of information that heighten
the public condemnation of the accused. 169 Accordingly, ethical rules now
forbid prosecutors to make "extrajudicial comments that have a substantial
likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused" and also
require them to "exercise reasonable care to prevent . .. law enforcement
personnel . . . or other persons . . . associated with the prosecutor" from

prejudicing the accused extra-judicially.1 70 Nevertheless, prosecutors have
commonly engaged in prejudicial pretrial publicity and persist in doing so.
Illustrative is the following statement that was made by a U.S. Attorney
at a press conference that was called to announce an indictment:
166. Martin, Court Reverses, supra note 164.
167. Id.
168.

FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 3; MONROE H. FREEDMAN & JANET STARWOOD, Prior Restraints

on Freedom of Expression by Defendants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum, 29
STAN. L. REv. 607, 613 (1977).
169. As a practical matter, the defendant can also be deprived of a fair trial. Unfortunately, however,
courts virtually never reverse a conviction when a prosecutor deprives a defendant of a fair trial through
pretrial publicity. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 4.09.
170.
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Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very happy to be here and to be . .. part

of something which I perceive to be probably the largest corruption,
criminal investigation, probably in the history of the nation. It
crosses city lines, it crosses state lines, it crosses federal lines. Also
it has its tentacles in Puerto Rico and probably in Hawaii .... I
suspect that the bottom line is that corruption or greed has no bias."'
Thus, the clear thrust of the prosecutor's statement was that the defendantswho were identified by name-were guilty of the largest crime of corruption
and greed in the history of the nation. 172
At the time of the prosecutor's statement in that case, a formal ethical
rule had not yet been adopted, but the U.S. Constitution has always forbidden
punishment without due process of law, and the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York subsequently found the prosecutor's
statement to have been "egregious." 1 73 Nevertheless, the prosecutor was
successful. Despite his egregious statement, along with other "massive
publicity" adverse to the defendants, and "shameful abuse" of grand jury
secrecy by the prosecutor, the court did not overturn the convictions in the
case. 174
Thus, prosecutors systematically and freely inflict severe punishment on
defendants-the modern equivalent of the pillory-before the defendants
have even had their day in court and regardless of innocence-in-fact. For
example, after he was acquitted of criminal charges involving dishonesty, but
after years of lengthy adverse publicity, former U.S. Secretary of Labor Ray
Donovan bitterly commented, "[w]hich office do I go to to get my reputation
back?"175
A variation on this kind of punishment without due process is the "perp
walk." A recent example occurred in April 2012 in New York City.176
Despite ample documentary evidence that he could not have been the man
who had molested four women, Karle Vanderwoud, a young man who works
in private finance, was arrested for the crime. 177
While Vanderwoud was in his holding cell, the police taunted him by
commenting on how many photographers, whom they had alerted, were
waiting outside to take his picture on his way to court.178 After a large
number had gathered, the police led him in handcuffs through the
171. United States v. Simon, 664 F. Supp. 780, 794 n.17 (S.D.N.Y.1987).
172. The case was not Teapot Dome, Watergate, or Enron, but Wedtech-a name that is not likely to
make the list of historic scandals.
173. Simon, 664 F. Supp. at 794 n.17.
174. Id. at 792.
175. Selwyn Raab, Donovan Cleared of Fraud Chargesby Jury in Bronx, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 1987),
available at http://www.nytimes.con/1987/05/26/nyregion/donovan-cleared-of-fraud-charges-by-jury-inbronx.html?pagewanted=all&sre-pm.
176. Jim Dwyer, Cleared, but Will the Next Person Be So Lucky?, N.Y. TIMES, May II, 2012, at A25,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/1l/nyregion/karl-vanderwoude-wrongly-accused-and-clearedby-the-nypd.html.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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photographers, who took hundreds of photographs of him.179 Inevitably,
pictures of Vanderwoud's perp walk were widely published, along with
headlines calling him the "Grope Sicko" and the "dapper fiend." 8 0
Although perp walks are carried out by the police, they are ordinarily
coordinated with prosecutors to coincide with the accused's arraignment.
Also, there is no indication that prosecutors exercise reasonable care to
prevent the orchestrated perp walk.181
VIII. CONCLUSION
Despite the reluctance of courts to find that prosecutors have acted
unethically, a difficulty in writing this Article has been selecting illustrations
from an extremely large number of cases that could have been used as
examples of unethical and unconstitutional conduct by prosecutors' offices.
Part of the problem is the failure of judges to recognize even flagrant, willful,
or bad faith misconduct by prosecutors. Another is the failure of courts and
disciplinary committees to hold prosecutors accountable even when serious
misconduct is uncovered.

As a number of authorities have concluded, the failure to hold
prosecutors accountable has contributed to a culture in too many prosecutors'
offices in which prosecutors act as if they are above constitutional and ethical
restraints. According to Professors Abbe Smith and Paul Butler, the role of
prosecutor is inherently corrupting. 182 As Smith has said, the "current culture
of prosecution fosters rigidity, cynicism, and a tendency to engage in willful
or careless abuse of official power."l83 Certainly, the cases recounted here
and numerous others tend to confirm that view.

Nevertheless, I advise students who are interested in public interest
careers to consider joining a prosecutor's office. I do that because I know that
one can do more good as an honest and conscientious prosecutor than as a
zealous criminal defense lawyer. A defense lawyer may be able to expose
unlawful law enforcement and prosecutorial misconduct, but a prosecutor of
"honor, temperament, and professionalism" can prevent those abuses from
ever happening.1 84 I therefore maintain the hope that an increasing number of
conscientious prosecutors will help to protect society from antisocial people
without helping to create an antisocial state.

179. Id.
180.

Id.

181. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3(c)(1) cmt. 1; 8.4(a); 8.4(d) (2012).
182. PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE (2009); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good
Prosecutor?,14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 355 (2001).
183. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 10.18.
184. Irving Younger, Memoir ofa Prosecutor,62 COMMENT., Oct. 1976, at 70.

